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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
On or about November 4, 1988, Petitioner, Tel-America of 
Salt Lake City, Inc. (f,Tel-Americaff), filed with the Public 
Service Commission of Utah (the "Commission") an Amended Request 
for Agency Action in Docket No. 88-049-18, requesting that the 
Commission (a) initiate an investigation into the rate of return 
realized by U.S. West Communications ("U.S. West"), formerly 
known as "Mountain Bell", for the calendar years 1987 and 1988; 
(b) declare U.S. West to be in violation of the Commission's 
Order in Docket No. 85-049-02 issued December 31, 1985 (the 
"1985 Order"); and (c) order U.S. West to refund to all Utah 
ratepayers those monies which the Commission found U.S. West 
earned in excess of is authorized rate of return for 1987 and 
1988 as fixed in Docket No. 85-049-02. (R. at 8-9) On March 
30, 1989, the Commission issued its Order (the "March 30, 1989 
Order") denying Tel-America1s Amended Request for Agency Action 
(R. at 677-681), and on May 18, 1989, the Commission denied Tel-
America's Petition for Review or Rehearing thereon (R. at 703-
705). Tel-America1s Petition for Review was filed with the 
clerk of the Utah Supreme Court on June 15, 1989. 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to determine the 
issues cited herein pursuant to Utah Code Ann. SS 54-7-15, -17 
and -18, 5$ 64-46b-14, -16 and -17 and Rule 14 of the Rules of 
the Utah Supreme Court. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the Commission has the lawful authority to 
grant the relief requested by Tel-America in its Amended Request 
for Agency Action• 
2. Whether the Commission erred in denying Tel-America1s 
Amended Request for Agency Action. 
3. Whether the Commission erred in ruling that the Utah 
Supreme Court's decision in Utah Department of Business 
Regulation v. Public Service Commission, 720 P.2d 420 (Utah 
1986) controlled the Commission's decision in this case. 
4. Whether the Commission erred when it ruled that the 
instant circumstances do not fit within any recognized 
exceptions to the rule that requires ratemaking occur 
prospectively only. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES WHOSE 
INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
Utah Code Ann. 5 54-3-1: 
All charges made, demanded or received by any public 
utility, or by any two or more public utilities, for 
any product or commodity furnished or to be furnished, 
or for any service rendered or to be rendered, shall 
be just and reasonable. Every unjust or unreasonable 
charge made, demanded or received for such product or 
commodity or service is hereby prohibited and declared 
unlawful. . . . All rules and regulations made by a 
public utility affecting or pertaining to its charges 
or service to the public shall be just and reasonable. 
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Utah Code Ann. S 54-4-4(1): 
Whenever the commission shall find after a hearing 
that the rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges or 
classifications, or any of them demanded, observed, 
charged or collected by any public utility for any 
service or product or commodity, or in connection 
therewith, . . . rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges 
or classifications, . . . are unjust, unreasonable, 
discriminatory or preferential, or in anywise in 
violation of any provisions of law, or that such 
rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges or 
classifications are insufficient, the commission shall 
determine the just, reasonable or sufficient rates, 
fares, tolls, rentals, charges, classifications, 
rules, regulations, practices or contracts to be 
thereafter observed and in force, and shall fix the 
same by order as hereinafter provided. 
Utah Code Ann. S 54-7-20(1): 
When complaint has been made to the Commission 
concerning any rate, fare, toll, rental or charge for 
any product or commodity furnished or service 
performed by any public utility, and the Commission 
has found, after investigation, that the public 
utility has charged an amount for such product, 
commodity or service in excess of the schedules, rates 
and tariffs on file with the Commission, or has 
charged an unjust, unreasonable or discriminatory 
amount against the complainant, the Commission may 
order that the public utility make due reparation to 
the complainant with interest from the date of 
collection. . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 2, 1988, Tel-America filed its Amended Request 
for Agency Action in Docket No. 88-049-18. Tel-America 
requested therein that the Commission (1) initiate an 
investigation into the rate of return realized by U.S. West for 
the calendar years 1987 and 1988 and release to the public the 
3 
results of this investigation; (2) declare U.S. West to be in 
violation of the 1985 Order; and (3) order U.S. West to refund 
to all of Utah ratepayers those monies which the Commission 
finds U.S. West had earned in excess of its authorized rate of 
return for 1987 and 1988 as fixed in Docket No. 85-049-02. (R. 
at 8-9) 
Pursuant to the 1985 Order, the Commission found that the 
allowable rate of return for U.S. West would be 14.2% from and 
after January 1, 1986. (R. at 810) U.S. West has previously 
submitted answers to interrogatories that acknowledged that for 
the calendar years 1987 and 1988 it had exceeded the allowable 
rate of return proscribed in the 1985 Order. (R. at 896-898, 
901-903) The dollar amount by which the rate of return was 
exceeded is in dispute, however, it appears from evidence 
introduced in Dockets No. 88-049-18 and 88-049-07 that the 
amount could be in the range of tens of millions of dollars. 
(R. at 897) 
Tel-America1s Amended Request for Agency Action was heard 
by the Commission on February 24, 1989. The Commission heard 
arguments on the issue of whether the Commission had the legal 
authority to grant the relief requested. No evidence was 
introduced or received by the Commission except that previously 
submitted in briefs by the parties and in connection with Docket 
No. 88-049-07. 
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On March 30, 1989, the Commission issued its written order 
denying Tel-Americafs Amended Request for Agency Action. The 
Commission did find, however, that U.S. West had earned in 
excess of its authorized rate of return in calendar years 1987 
and 1988. (R. at 678.) The Commission further found that one 
of the reasons for the overearning was the impact upon U.S. West 
of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. (R. at 678) The Commission 
concluded, however, that the Utah Supreme Court's decision in 
Utah Department of Business Regulation, supra, which mandated 
that ratemaking generally occur prospectively only and precluded 
the Commission from granting the relief sought by Tel-America. 
(R. at 679-680) The Commission noted, however, that certain 
exceptions to the rule against retroactive ratemaking exist but 
found that the facts of the instant case did not fall within 
such exceptions without any evidentiary basis upon which to 
support its conclusion. (R. at 680) 
On April 28, 1989, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review 
or Rehearing requesting a rehearing pursuant to applicable 
statute. (R. at 684-693) By Commission Order dated May 18, 
1989, the Petition for Review or Rehearing was denied. (R. at 
703-705) Thereafter, on June 15, 1989, Tel-America filed its 
Petition for Review with the Utah Supreme Court seeking review 
of the Commission's March 30, 1989 denial of Petitioner's 
Amended Request for Agency Action, as well as the Commission's 
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May 18, 1989 denial of Tel-America1s Petition for Review or 
Rehearing, both in Docket No. 88-049-18. (R. at 708-725) On 
June 16, 1989, MCI Telecommunications Corporation (ffMCItf) filed 
a Petition for Review of the Commission's March 30, 1989 Order 
denying MCI's Amended Request for Agency Action filed 
simultaneously with, and in the same form and substance as, Tel-
America's Amended Request for Agency Action, as well as the 
Commission's May 18, 1989 denial of MCI's Petition for Review 
or Rehearing. (R. at 726-739) On September 15, 1989, MCI and 
Tel-America's appeals were consolidated as Case No. 890251. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Commission erred when it entered its March 30, 
1989 Order in ruling that Utah Department of Business 
Regulation, supra, controlled its action under the instant 
circumstances. While the Court's decision requires that under 
the circumstances presented therein ratemaking occur 
prospectively only, the case has no applicability to the facts 
in this case. 
2. The Commission's 1985 Order established rates which 
were predicated in part on the Commission's determination that 
the rate of return specified therein was just and reasonable. 
The rate of return realized by U.S. West in 1987 and 1988 
substantially exceeded that authorized by the Commission in its 
1985 Order. The Commission clearly has the authority to enforce 
6 
its orders and, therefore, any requirement that U.S. West refund 
amounts earned in excess of its authorized rate of return would 
be an enforcement of the Commission's 1985 Order and would not 
constitute retroactive ratemaking. 
3. Assuming, arguendo, that the relief sought by Tel-
America constitutes retroactive ratemaking, the Commission erred 
in denying Tel-America's Amended Request for Agency Action by 
ruling that the instant circumstances did not fall within the 
recognized exceptions to the rule against retroactive 
ratemaking. The Commission and numerous other jurisdictions 
have recognized exceptions to the so-called "rule against 
retroactive ratemaking." One exception generally recognized is 
that of unforeseen and unanticipated events over which the 
utility has little or no control. That exception to the rule 
against retroactive ratemaking would apply in the instant matter 
where changes to the federal tax laws were enacted which 
resulted in U.S. West rate of return exceeding that proscribed 
by the Commission, an event which was clearly unforeseen and 
unanticipated at the time the 1985 Order was issued by the 
Commission and over which neither U.S. West nor the ratepayers 
had any control. As such, the authority of the Commission to 
require U.S. West to refund excess earnings falls within 
recognize exceptions to the rule against retroactive ratemaking. 
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4. The Commission has authority to require a refund 
through the reparations provisions of Utah Code Ann. S 54-7-20. 
The amounts charged to customers in 1987 and 1988 for telephone 
services received which resulted in earnings in excess of that 
amount which the Commission had determined to be just and 
reasonable were clearly "unjust, unreasonable and 
discriminatory" against Tel-America and all ratepayers in the 
State of Utah. Read in conjunction with Utah Code Ann. S 54-3-
1 the statutes provide the Commission with the express authority 
to order the requested refund in reparation of unjust and 
unreasonable charges previously imposed upon the ratepayers. 
5. The Commission erred in denying Tel-America1s Amended 
Request for Agency Action because U.S. West should be estopped 
from asserting the defense of the rule against retroactive 
ratemaking to bar the relief sought by Tel-America. Further, 
the doctrine of unjust enrichment requires that U.S. West refund 
its excess earnings to Utah ratepayers. U.S. West, as with any 
other public utility, is entitled to the opportunity to earn a 
fair return. The Commission by its 1985 Order set the upper 
limit of what that fair return would be. To the extent that 
certain intervening events have resulted in a windfall, the 
windfall should inure to the benefit of ratepayers. Otherwise, 
U.S. West will be permitted to retain earnings in excess of that 
to which U.S. West was lawfully entitled or which could had been 
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reasonable expected by U.S. West. On the other hand, failure 
to order a refund will result in U.S. West ratepayers having 
paid more for service that what they were legally or equitably 
be obligated to pay. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN RULING THAT UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION, SUPRA, 
REQUIRED IT TO DENY PETITIONER'S AMENDED 
REQUEST FOR AGENCY ACTION. 
In its March 30, 1989 Order, the Commission ruled that the 
Court's decision in Utah Department of Business Regulation, 
supra, controlled its action and required it to deny the Amended 
Request for Agency Action. (R. at 679) Tel-America submits 
that while ratemaking is generally of prospective application, 
the Supreme Court's decision in Utah Department of Business 
Regulation, supra, is inapplicable to the relief sought by 
Petitioner's in Docket No. 88-049-18, The issue before the 
Court in Utah Department of Business Regulation, supra, was 
whether the Commission was authorized to allow a diversion of 
funds from an energy balancing account to UP&L's general 
account. The Court recognized that the narrow issue before it 
was "whether the PSC's actions amounted to retroactive 
ratemaking.11 720 P.2d 424. The Court concluded that the pass-
through legislation authorizing the Commission to permit interim 
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rate changes which are necessary because of unexpected increases 
in certain types of costs did not grant the Commission the 
regulatory authority to permit a utility to have retroactive 
revenue adjustments in order to guaranty shareholders a rate of 
return. Id. at p. 423. In so holding the Court found that "the 
bar on retroactive ratemaking has no exception for missteps made 
in the ratemaking process. Id. 
In the instant case, U.S. West's earnings in 1987 and 1988 
in excess of those authorized by the Commission were directly 
attributable to changes in the federal income tax law. (R. at 
678) The Commission's reliance upon Utah Department of Business 
Regulation, supra, proceeds from a mistaken premise. U.S. 
West's overearnings resulted not from regulatory error or 
mistakes or missteps in the regulatory process but from a 
congressional decision to reduce corporate taxes which, when the 
Commission established U.S. West's rates in 1985, were not and 
could not have been predicted. Thus, the overearnings were the 
result of intervening events occurring subsequent to the 
ratemaking process which were extraordinary and unforeseen 
rather than "missteps made in the ratemaking process.9' Id. 
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POINT II 
THE COMMISSION HAS THE POWER TO ENFORCE ITS 
1985 GENERAL RATE ORDER. 
The Commission is clearly vested with the power to enforce 
its own orders pursuant to the broad grant of authority under 
Utah Code Ann. $ 54-4-1, which authority has been read together 
with the specific reparation authority in Utah Code Ann. S 54-
7-20 to empower it to order refunds in cases of excess earnings 
by utilities. Garkane Power Ass'n v. Public Service Commission, 
681 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1984). 
The 1985 Order authorized a rate of return of 14.2% for 
U.S. West. (R. at 810) The authorized rate of return is 
frequently characterized as a "limit" on the utility's ability 
to collect revenue. According to the Rhode Island Public 
Utilities Commission, "'the utility's return allowance might be 
compared with a fishing or hunting license with a limit on the 
catch. Such a license does not guaranty that the holder will 
catch anything at all; it simply makes the catch legal (up to 
a specified limit) provided the holder is successful in his own 
efforts.11' Re Narragansett Electric Co.# 57 Pub. Util. Rep. 
4th (PUR) 549, 555 (R.I. Pub. Util. Comm. 1984) (quoting Welch, 
Cases and Text on Public Utility Regulation, 478 (Rev. Ed. 
1968)). 
After analyzing the same question in other jurisdictions, 
the Rhode Island Commission concluded that: 
11 
The allowed rate of return prescribes a limit to the 
earnings of regulated utility. If this were not so, 
there would be no reason for the regulatory process 
and the setting of authorized rates of return would 
be reduced to a charade. If the regulatory process 
is to have credibility and if it is truly protect the 
interest of both the consumer and the shareholder, 
this commission must exercise its authority to prevent 
unauthorized profit margins. 
Narragansett, Pub. util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 556. 
The Commission's Order was affirmed by the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court. Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Burke, 505 A.2d 1147 
(R.I. 1986) ("Burke II"). In the instant case, the Utah 
Commission faced the same situation. The Commission has the 
duty and the authority to enforce its 1985 Order and require 
U.S. West to refund excess earnings. 
POINT III 
THE RULE AGAINST RETROACTIVE RATEMAKING IS 
NOT A BAR IN THIS ACTION. 
A. The exception to the rule against retroactive 
ratemaking for "unforeseen" circumstances applies in 
this case. 
In its March 30, 1989 Order, the Commission recognized that 
certain exceptions to the rule against retroactive ratemaking 
exist. (R. at 680) The Commission cited as examples those 
instances where "its could be demonstrated that the utility had 
misrepresented important ratemaking information or otherwise 
mislead regulators, or where a prior rate has been nullified as 
a result of a Supreme Court Order, or possibly other situations 
12 
could be suggested." (R. at 680) The Commission found, 
however, the facts concerning the instant matter did not fall 
within such exceptions. The Commission arrived at its decision, 
however, without any evidentiary basis upon which it could 
predicate its conclusion. Tel-America submits that the 
Commission erred in that it did not, and could not with the 
evidentiary record before it, properly consider the exceptions 
to the rule against retroactive ratemaking cited by it as well 
as other exceptions which are well-recognized. 
Many jurisdictions have recognized an exception to the rule 
against retroactive ratemaking where a utility experiences a 
loss due to extraordinary and unforeseen events. Pittman v. 
Public Serv. Comm., 520 S.2d 1355, 1360 (Miss. 1987); Consumer 
Advocate v. Commerce Comm., 428 N.W.2d 302, 306 (Iowa 1988); 
Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, Inc. v. Public Service 
Commission, 298 N.W.2d 205 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980); Narragansett 
Electric Co. v. Burke, 415 A.2d 177 (R.I. 1980) ("Burke I"). 
All exceptions to the rule against based on the premise 
that no rule should work to undermine its original purpose. 
Pittman, supra, at P. 1360; Consumer Advocate, supra, at p. 306. 
While decisions invoking exceptions to retroactive ratemaking 
for unforeseen circumstances generally benefited utilities, the 
same rationale must be applied to give the ratepayers the 
benefit of such circumstances, as in the case of U.S. West's 
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earnings in 1987 and 1988# when a utility encounters unexpected 
profits due to events which were unforeseen and over which the 
utility had no control. 
In Narragansett 57 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 549, the Rhode 
Island Public Utilities Commission adopted this reasoning in 
ordering excess earnings returned to ratepayers when earnings 
significantly exceeded the rate of return authorized by the 
Rhode Island Commission which earning were attributable to 
"unanticipated economic growth in unusual summer weather." jld. 
at p. 553. U.S. West's excess earnings meet all of the 
requirements for the application on an exception to the rule 
against retroactive ratemaking. Earnings in excess of those 
authorized by the Commission have been found to be attributable 
to changes in federal income tax law, an event over which U.S. 
West had no control and which was unforeseeable at the time of 
the ratemaking process. 
B. The rules against retroactive ratemaking does not 
preclude the granting of refunds where a utility has 
earned in excess of its authorized rate of return. 
Courts have generally indicated that the rule against 
retroactive ratemaking is to ensure that "present consumers will 
not be required to pay for past deficits of the company"; and 
that it "prevents the company from employing future rates as a 
means of ensuring investments of its stockholders." Burke I, 
415 A.2d at 178-189. Certainly application of the rule against 
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retroactive ratemaking in the instant case will not serve to 
advance the reasons for which the rule is designed. In the 
instant case, millions of ratepayer dollars were collected to 
pay U.S. West taxes which were no longer required and then 
retained by U.S. West as windfall profits in excess of that 
which the company was authorized to earn. 
The rule against retroactive ratemaking is founded in the 
legislative nature of the Commission's ratemaking authority. 
Burke II , 505 A.2d 1148; Elizabeth Town Water Co. v. Board of 
Public Utilities, 527 A.2d 354 (N.J. 1987). Because ratemaking 
is recognized as legislative in nature, its retroactive 
application is prohibited under the same principles prohibiting 
retroactive application of a statute. Burke II, 505 A.2d 1148. 
Consistent with these legislative principles a refund order in 
connection with petitioner's Amended Request for Agency Action 
will violate the rule against retroactive ratemaking only if it 
denies the subject utility its constitutional rights under the 
due process and equal protection clauses. Id. 
Because U.S. West was never lawfully entitled to earn 
moneys in excess of the rates of return set by the Commission, 
it never had a vested interest in those moneys to which any 
constitutional right could attach. An order requiring U.S. West 
to return revenues which it does not lawfully own does not 
violate the constitutional right6 of the utility, nor does it 
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violate the rule against retroactive ratemaking. Id. at p. 
1149. 
In Burke II, the Rhode Island Supreme Court found that the 
utility had no vested rights to earn in excess of the authorized 
rate of return on equity. Furthermore, the Court noted that 
"the rationale behind the rule against retroactive ratemaking 
is that future rates may not be used to recoup past losses.11 
505 A.2d 1149 (citing Providence Gas Co. v. Burke, 475 A.2d 193, 
196 (R.I. 1984)). The Rhode Island Supreme Court clearly stated 
the two basic functions of the rule against retroactive 
ratemaking: 
To protect the public by ensuring that it will not be 
forced to pay past company deficits and future 
payments and also to prevent the company from 
employing future rates to insure its stockholders' 
investment. Concisely put, the rationale behind the 
rule against retroactive ratemaking is that future 
rates may not be used to recoup past losses. 
Id., citing Providence Gas Co. v. Burke, 475 A.2d 193, 196 (R.I. 
1984). 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court thus held that the rule 
against retroactive ratemaking does not preclude the granting 
of refunds where a utility has earned well in excess of its 
authorized rate of return. 
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POINT IV 
THE COMMISSION HAS THE EXPRESS AUTHORITY 
UNDER REPARATION STATUTES TO REQUIRE U.S. 
WEST TO REFUND ITS EARNINGS IN EXCESS OF 
THE AMOUNT AUTHORIZED BY THE 1985 ORDER. 
The rule against retroactive ratemaking does not apply to 
statutorily authorized reparations orders. Pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. S 54-4-4, the Commission is statutorily empowered to 
set rates which are "just and reasonable". The rates set by the 
Commission are not done so in the abstract or in a vacuum but 
are derived from revenue requirements based on the utilities' 
cost to provide services and a fair return on the investment by 
utilities1 shareholders. Both the cost of service and return 
on investment must be "just and reasonable" in order to produce 
rates that are "just and reasonable". In setting the rates the 
Commission necessarily determined in its 1985 Order that the 
rate of return which it allowed was "just and reasonable" and 
a fair return on investment. The result of the intervening 
changes in federal tax law, which changes were unforeseen at the 
time the 1985 Order was issued, the rate of return realized by 
U.S. West, even by U.S. West's own admissions, greatly exceeded 
that authorized by the Commission. To the extent the rate of 
return realized by U.S. West exceeded that found by the 
Commission to be "just and reasonable" in its 1985 Order, the 
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rates which are a derivation of the components cited above were 
not and could not be just and reasonable. 
Utah Code Ann. S 54-3-1 declares that "[Ejvery unjust and 
unreasonable charge made, demanded, or received for such 
product, commodity or service is hereby prohibited and declared 
unlawful.11 Charges for services provided by U.S. West which 
resulted in rate of return in excess of that found by the 
Commission in its 1985 Order were inherently unjust and 
unreasonable. 
Utah Code Ann. 5 54-7-20(1) provides that: 
When complaint has been made to the Commission 
concerning any rate . . . for any product or commodity 
furnished or service provided by any public utility, 
and the Commission has found, after investigation, 
that the public utility has charged and amount for 
such product, commodity or service in excess of the 
schedules, rates and tariffs on file with the 
Commission, or has charges an unjust, unreasonable, 
or discriminatory amount against the complainant, the 
Commission may order that the public utility make due 
reparation to the complainant therefore with interest 
from the date of collection. 
A plain reading of the above cited statute provides the 
Commission express authority to order such refund for the 
reparation required for unjustly or unreasonably charged 
ratepayers. Further, the authority granted pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. S 54-7-20(1) includes a remedy for both charges which 
are in excess of the schedules, rates and tariffs on file with 
the Commission and for charges which are unjust, unreasonable, 
or discriminatory. Clearly, the Utah legislature contemplated 
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that the ratepayers have a remedy for charges which were unjust 
and unreasonable and yet In compliance with schedules, rates and 
tariffs on file with the Commission. This reading of the 
statute is reenforced by S 54-7-20(b) which establishes two 
different statutes of limitations for claims for reparations. 
Complaints concerning unjust, unreasonable or discriminatory 
rates must be filed within one year while those concerning 
charges in excess of approved rates must be filed within two 
years. 
The reparations provision of the statutes has been used by 
the Commission to refund unanticipated utility revenues. In 
Garkane, 681 P.2d 1196, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed an order 
of the commission requiring Garkane Power Association 
("Garkane") to refund money received from wholesale sales of 
electric power. Garkane received a refund from its purchases 
of power as a result of an order by the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission ("FERC"). The Commission ordered that the 
refund to Garkane be passed on to the purchaser of Garkane fs 
power. The Utah Court found that the Commission's order was 
within its statutory power. Id. at 1206-07. 
Admittedly, there are some differences between Garkane and 
this case. Specifically, the power purchases were made pursuant 
to a contract between Garkane and the wholesale purchaser, CP 
National Corporation, and the Commission found that the rate 
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schedules adopted by the contract were expressly subject to 
increases or decreases based on Garkane's purchase price. 
Nevertheless, the decision indicates that reparations are 
appropriate where rates are made unreasonable by later increases 
in utility revenue. The same rationale should apply where 
decreases in costs have rendered rates unjust and unreasonable. 
In addition, the Commission has granted broad legislative, 
adjudicative and rule making powers which clearly authorize it 
to order the refund requested in this case. Utah Code Ann. § 
54-4-1 provides: 
The Commission is hereby vested with power and 
jurisdiction to supervise and regulate every public 
utility in the state and to supervise all of the 
business of every such public utility in the state, 
and to do all things, whether herein specifically 
designated or in addition thereto, which are necessary 
or convenient in the exercise of such power and 
jurisdiction; . . . (emphasis added). 
In Burke II, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island interpreting 
a statutory scheme similar to Utah's held that the Rhode Island 
Public Utilities Commission had the statutory authority to order 
ratepayers refunds. In Burke II, the utility appealed from a 
Rhode Island Public Utility Commission Order requiring a refund 
to customer for the utility had earned in excess of its 
authorized rate of return. The utility contended that the 19.1% 
rate of return (15.2% was authorized by the Commission) was due 
to productivity improvements, good weather, a strong economy and 
able management. The Rhode Island Supreme Court, in upholding 
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the Commission's decisions, found that the power to set rates 
would necessary include, by implication, the power to avoid 
windfalls to utilities and unjust enrichment by ordering refunds 
to ratepayers. Id. at p. 1148. 
In the instant case, the petitioners are not asking the 
Commission to retroactively adjust U.S. West's authorized rate 
of return; they are merely requesting enforcement of that limit. 
If the Commission refused to required of U.S. West to refund 
excess profits, then the Commission will have effectively 
modified its 1985 Order retroactively to provide for increase 
to the originally authorized approved rate of return. 
POINT V 
U.S. WEST SHOULD BE ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING 
THE DEFENSE OF THE RULE AGAINST RETROACTIVE 
RATEMAKING. 
If the Commission's decision is affirmed by this Court, 
then the Commission will have conferred a windfall on U.S. West 
to which U.S. West is not lawfully or equitably entitled. 
The Findings of Fact contained in the Commission's March 
30, 1989 Order detail the extended period over which U.S. West 
and the Division of Public Utilities (the "Division") analyzed 
information concerning the impact of the federal tax legislation 
on U.S. West earnings. (R. at 678-679) While the Commission 
found that the Division made a good faith effort to accurately 
and correctly analyze the information provided to it by U.S. 
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West (R. at 679), it certainly made no finding, nor could it had 
have made such a finding, with respect to U.S. West's effort to 
provide such information, including a correct analysis of the 
impact of the federal tax legislation. For a period of 
approximately two years, U.S. West continued to accumulate 
overearnings pending action by the Commission. (R. at 678-679) 
U.S. West should not now be able to assert the rule against 
retroactive ratemaking to block reparations for those 
unreasonable charges. The ratepayers of the State of Utah 
should not be made to suffer the consequences of the inaction, 
whether calculated or not, of the Division and U.S. West in 
protracting the investigatory and analytical process that 
ultimately led to the Commission's action in reducing rates in 
September 1988. 
When the rates set by the 1985 Order yielded earnings 
greatly in excess of that authorized by the Commission, U.S. 
West failed to promptly bring the matter to the attention of the 
Commission in order to establish new rates which would have 
resulted in earnings within legal limits imposed by the 1985 
Order. Instead, U.S. West chose a course of action which, 
contrary to both the spirit and the letter of the 1985 Order, 
resulted in excess earnings which may amount to tens of millions 
of dollars (R. at 897) to which it was not entitled by which it 
would be clearly unjustly enriched. 
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POINT VI 
THE DOCTRINE OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT REQUIRES 
THAT U.S. WEST REFUND ITS EXCESS EARNINGS 
TO UTAH RATEPAYERS. 
U.S. West holds a franchise from the citizens of the State 
of Utah to provide telephone service pursuant to the rates 
established by the Commission under Utah law. In providing such 
service, U.S. West is entitled to an opportunity to earn a fair 
return. Logan City v. Public Utilities Commission, 77 Utah 442, 
296 P.2d 1006 (1931). By its 1985 Order, the Commission set the 
upper limit of what that fair return would be. Given U.S. 
West's dilatory actions in bringing the impact of the changes 
in the federal tax law to the attention of the Commission and 
the time delay in implementing corrective action, U.S. West 
would be unjustly enriched to the detriment of ratepayers if 
permitted to retain the subject excess earnings. 
U.S. West had no expectation that it would earn a rate in 
excess of that authorized by the Commission. To the extent 
certain intervening events have resulted in a windfall, the 
windfall should enure to the benefits of the ratepayers and not 
U.S. West. Requiring U.S. West to refund overearnings only 
forces U.S. West to do that which it should have done on its own 
initiative pursuant to the franchise granted It by the State of 
Utah when the Commission Initiated its investigation of the 
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impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on utilities earnings on 
December 9, 1986. 
The requested refund would not deprive U.S. West of any 
earnings in excess of that to which U.S. West was lawfully 
entitled or could have been reasonably expected by U.S. West. 
On the other hand, failure to order refund will result in 
ratepayers having paid more for service than what they should 
have been legally or equitably obligated to pay. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Court should reverse 
the decision of the Commission in its March 30, 1989 and May 18, 
1989 Orders and direct the Commission to grant the action sought 
in petitioners Amended Request for Agency Action. 
DATED this 8th day of November, 1989. 
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